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The Communist coup attempt in Estonia on  
1 December 1924: the last but one attempt 
 at world revolution?
The Communist coup attempt on 1 December 1924 has been discussed in the 
historiography of Estonia and not only Estonia for more than 90 years already. 
According to the prevailing opinion of Estonian historiography the coup and its 
successful suppression finally defined the Communists as the archenemy of Esto-
nian statehood. Their underground organisations were destroyed and the partici-
pants of the coup were sentenced to death, long prison sentences or forced labour 
at the military circuit court or by court martial. However, it is worth mentioning 
that normal diplomatic relations between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet 
Union were maintained uninterrupted in spite of the events. Although the Esto-
nian state agencies were informed of the Soviet support to Estonian Communists 
and also of the activities of Estonian Communist organisations in the Soviet Uni-
on, the coup was treated in the public as separate from the inter-state relations 
between Estonia and the Soviet Union. 
The unsuccessful coup attempt became one of the main issues of an internal 
fight between two factions of the Estonian Communists in the Soviet Union. One 
faction included the men and women who had been illegally in Estonia and had 
fought against the Estonian Republic. The other faction was the so-called Fon-
taniks (the office of the Central Committee of the Estonian sections of the Rus-
sian Communist (Bolshevik) Party was located in Fontanka Street in Leningrad). 
Their main focus had been on building up the Estonian Communist organisation 
in the Soviet Union. 
One has to remember here that various activities of national minorities were 
supported by the leadership of the Communist party until Stalin’s purges in the 
second half of the 1930s. That included support to the Party and Communist 
Youth organisations, newspapers, primary schools and even local municipalities. 
During that time up to 100,000 ethnic Estonians lived in the Soviet Union. The 
majority lived in villages concentrated in the area between Leningrad, Novgorod, 
Pskov and Estonian border, but other groups lived in Siberia, Northern Caucasus 
and the Crimea. Most had migrated to Russia from the last quarter of the 19th 
century to the beginning of the Great War. The number of ethnic Estonians in 
Estonia itself was about one million.
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After the 1940 occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union and particularly after 
World War II, the December 1924 coup attempt became one of the cornerstones 
of the Communist historiography of the Estonian working class and the Esto-
nian Soviet Socialist Republic. The official Soviet names of the event became “the 
uprising…” or “the armed uprising of 1 December 1924”. It belonged to the prima-
ry and secondary school history curricula and the participants of the coup were 
honoured as the martyrs or heroes of the Estonian working class fight against 
the Estonian bourgeoisie. The narrative became more important after Stalin’s 
death and the condemnation of his personality cult at the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. This was because many organisers 
and leaders of the coup, including Jaan Anvelt as the most famous among them, 
had been executed during Stalin purges in 1936–1938 and their names had been 
erased from the Communist historiography for two decades. A culmination of 
remembering of the coup took place in 1974 at the 50th anniversary. It included 
the revelation of a magnificent monument in front of Tallinn central station as 
well as numerous commemoration meetings. It was followed in 1977 by a fictio-
nal movie on the Communist movement in Estonia after the coup.1
After the fall of the Soviet Union and restoration of Estonian independence the 
monument was soon moved to the backyard of the Estonian History Museum, 
and thereafter an effort was made to place the coup in a real historical context. In 
1996 a collection of research articles by Estonian historians together with reprints 
of a large number of archival documents was published.2 
At the 90th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia in 2008 a fiction movie 
named December Heat3 was produced about the coup and its suppression. With 
the movie a new collection of articles was published with some research texts.4 It 
tried to present some parallels between the coup of 1924 and the riots in Tallinn 
in April 2007, when the monument of the Soviet soldiers was removed from city 
center in front of the National Library to the military cemetery. 
Thereafter the Estonian historians have continued working on the coup and 
the Communist subversive activities in Estonia during the early 1920s. Since 2014 
the coup tactics employed and its background have been analysed and compared 
with similar events in other countries at same time, for example in Tatarbunary 
in Bessarabia.5
The aim of this article is to show the background and preparations of the coup 
in both Estonia and in the Soviet Union, as well as to give an overview of events 
and to analyse the tactics of both sides. In addition, particular attention will be 
paid to the propaganda use of the coup by the Government of Estonia and by 
Soviet authorities. Finally the events will be discussed with an inclusion of the 
contemporary context. 
The article will end with a discussion of the historiography and sources.
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Background
During 1917–1924 the leftist parties had quite a strong popular support in Esto-
nia. In Tsarist Russia the absolute majority of Estonians belonged to a peasantry 
living on the large estates of the Baltic German landowning nobility. 
The Estonian national ideology – the first texts were published in 1860s – was 
fiercely anti-German, emphasizing the conquest of the Teutonic crusaders in the 
beginning of 13th Century and “slavery” (meaning serfdom, abolished in Esto-
nian and Livonian provinces in 1816 and 1819 respectively) of Estonian peasants 
under Baltic-German barons during 700 years thereafter. During the Russian 
revolution of 1905 a violent uprising initiated by the leftist agitators from the 
towns broke out in the Estonian countryside, culminating in winter 1905–1906. 
Altogether 160 manor houses were pillaged or burnt down (one nobleman was 
killed). 
A State of War was declared by the government in the Baltic provinces. Ad 
hoc punishment squads under the command of General Vladimir Bezobrazov, a 
guard cavalry brigade commander, were formed from soldiers, sailors and gen-
darmerie. They were deployed to the Estonian countryside to suppress the upris-
ing. More than 100 rebels were killed in the skirmishes or sentenced to death 
by court-martial and executed. Thousands were punished with caning (that was 
abolished in Russian Empire in 1904, but still permitted as a military punish-
ment) and deported to Siberia; the houses of more active participants were burnt 
down as a revenge. The event finally poisoned the relationship between Estonians 
and Baltic Germans that had slowly improved during the forced Russification of 
the Baltic provinces since the 1890s.
The first Estonian political parties were founded after the Tsar’s Manifesto of 17 
(30) October 1905 had introduced basic civil liberties to Russia and announced 
the election to the first State Duma. The Estonian nationalist-liberal Progressive 
Party of Jaan Tõnisson and the Estonian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party were 
created, but there were also Estonian Radicals (a left-liberal bourgeois party), So-
cialist Revolutionaries and others. Estonian Bolsheviks were an integral part of 
the Russian Bolsheviks.
Between the 1905 revolutionary disorder and the start of the First World War 
the development of industry in Estonian towns accelerated, particularly due to 
the defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Russian-Japanese war. Part of the new 
fleet was built in Tallinn, where new shipyards, machine plants and other enter-
prises were established as the infrastructure for the new fleet.6 A large number of 
Estonian peasants moved to the towns, mainly to Tallinn and Narva, but many 
other new workers came from Russia. In 1912 the construction of the works of 
Peter the Great Sea Fortress7 began on the Estonian coast and additional workers 
were hired from both Estonia and Russia. The increasing number of industrial 
urban workers meant an ever stronger base for leftist-revolutionary groups.
After the Russian revolution in March 1917 the Estonian politicians achie-
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ved the incorporation of the counties with Estonian population of the Estland 
and Livland provinces into one autonomous Estonian province. The permission 
was also given to form national Estonian units of the Russian Army. During that 
spring the Russian Army was demoralised and lot of units were taken over by the 
soldiers’ committees; so tens of thousands of Estonians, mobilised to the Russian 
army, could return to their homeland due to that permission. In January 1918 
there were four infantry regiments with cavalry and artillery and the headquar-
ters of the 1st Estonian Division. 
In summer 1917 the Provincial Assembly (also called the Diet) with 62 seats 
was elected by the deputies of local municipalities, where all political movements 
were represented from the Bolsheviks on the left to the Rural Party of Konstan-
tin Päts, the most conservative Estonian party, on the right. After the Bolsheviks 
took power in St. Petersburg on 25 October (7 November) the Military Revolu-
tionary Committee of the Bolsheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries – the Estonian 
Bolshevik Viktor Kingissepp was one of its three leaders – took power in Tallinn. 
As the Provincial Assembly was not dissolved, a system of dual power was now 
reality. On 15 (28) November the Assembly declared itself the sole highest power 
Viktor Kingissepp in 1918. 
Photo is taken in Moscow 
(RA, ERAF.2.1.444.1)
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in Estonia, but the Bolsheviks reacted by desolving it. However, the Assembly 
continued its activities underground and a Council of Elders of the Provincial 
Assembly was elected. On 19 February 1918 the Council of Elders founded the 
three-member Salvation Committee (Konstantin Päts from the Rural Party, Kon-
stantin Konik from the Democratic Party and Jüri Vilms from the Labour Party). 
It proclaimed the Estonian Independence on 24 February with the leaflet “Mani-
festo to all Peoples of Estonia”, using the few hours available between the departure 
of the Bolsheviks under Jaan Anvelt and the arrival of the German troops that 
approached Tallinn. The German troops had landed on the islands Saaremaa and 
Hiiumaa in October 1917 and hereafter controlled the islands. On land the Ger-
man front had at that time advanced from Riga towards the north on the eastern 
side of Riga Gulf (see below). 
In Estonia the political struggle of the Bolsheviks against the supporters of 
Estonian independence had continued. In January 1918 the Second Congress of 
the Estonian Military was held in Tallinn. The First Congress had taken place 
in July 1917 and had elected the Main Committee of Estonian Military, with a 
24-member political leadership representing all Estonian national units of the 
Russian army. A lot of politicians belonged to the committee as wartime mo-
bilised reserve officers. The chairman was Ensign Konstantin Päts. Despite of 
majority of the left delegates at this Second Congress, its resolution supported 
Estonian independence. However, as the Estonian Division headquarters were 
taken over by the Bolsheviks, the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Johan 
Laidoner, was forced to leave for Russia.
Meanwhile the peace negotiations between Soviet Russia and Central Powers 
were interrupted and Central Powers began the offensive on Eastern Front. On 
18 February 1918 the German troops crossed from Saaremaa via Muhu over the 
ice to mainland Estonia and continued towards Tallinn and Tartu. Thereafter 
Northern Latvia and Estonia were quickly brought under control. German troops 
entered Tallinn on 25 February, few hours after the proclamation of Estonian in-
dependence. The Germans did not recognise the new state and a formal regime 
of military occupation was introduced as a part of the military government area 
called Ober Ost. Estonian national units had declared themselves neutral in the 
war between the Soviet Russia and Germany, but they were dissolved by the Ger-
mans in April. Most of the Estonian Bolsheviks had escaped to Kronstadt and 
Petrograd on board of Baltic Fleet vessels.
After the Revolution in Germany in November 1918 the German troops left 
Estonia. The high commissioner of Germany in the Baltics, August Winnig, han-
ded over power in Estonia to the representatives of Estonian Provisional Govern-
ment with Konstantin Päts as the prime minister. However, at the same time the 
Red Army began the offensive against the retreating Germans and entered the 
territory of the emerging new states. The Estonian government decided to resist 
the offensive of the Red Army and called for army volunteers, soon followed by a 
general mobilisation. 
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The Estonian resistance was supported by the British Royal Navy warships in 
the Gulf of Finland and also volunteers, especially from Finland, but also Sweden 
and Denmark. The Estonian Army cooperated when necessary and to please the 
Entente with the White Guard North-western Army of General Nikolaj Judenič 
and with the troops of Stanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz in the Pskov Region. 
The fighting continued to the end of 1919, and on 2 February 1920 the Tartu 
Peace Treaty was signed between Soviet Russia and Estonia. Estonia was the first 
country in Europe that recognised Soviet Russia, defying the suggestions of the 
Entente, of whom some still hoped to defeat of Bolsheviks. However, the possi-
bilities of maintaining Estonian independence in case of the restoration of Rus-
sian strength and self-confidence seemed limited without the support from other 
great powers it had received during the War of Independence, especially from 
Britain. 
As the fighting started on 29 November 1918, the Soviets had proclaimed 
a puppet state, the Commune of the Working People of Estonia in Narva. The 
purpose was to present Soviet Russia’s invasion of Estonia as a war of Estonian 
workers and peasantry against the “exploiting classes”. At this time the Soviet Rus-
sian leadership still hoped to trigger a world revolution. The workers’ riots in 
Germany and in the cities of the collapsing Austro-Hungarian Empire were seen 
by the Soviets as the signs of the spreading revolution. One also has to remem-
ber that during this period thousands of former prisoners-of-war returned from 
Bolshevik infected Russia to their homeland in Central and Eastern Europe.8 
The council of the Narva Commune, with Jaan Anvelt seated in the sofa as the second from 
the left followed by Otto Rästas in sweater. (RA, ERAF.2.1.553.1)
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The chairman of the Estonian Commune was the Estonian Bolshevik Jaan 
Anvelt, who left Tallinn before the arrival of the Germans in February after the 
short period of Bolshevik rule. Formally the Commune had even its own army, 
the Estonian Red Rifle Regiments, however, the full command remained in the 
hands of the Russian Red Army commanders.9 Normally it was the Russian and 
Red Latvian units as well as a few so-called internationalists including even some 
Chinese troops that fought against the Estonian army in 1919. In territories in 
northeastern and southeastern Estonia that were controlled by the Red Army in 
winter 1918–19, Soviet rule with Red Terror had been applied. In Tartu as well 
as in Rakvere and in other localities many were murdered before the retreat of 
the Reds in January 1919. By the end of April 1919 the Estonian army with the 
support of allies had liberated Estonian territory, and on 5 June 1919 the Soviets 
officially dissolved the Commune.
When elections were held to a 120-seat Constitutional Assembly in April 
1919 in the middle of the war, the parties on the Left were still successful. The 
Social Democrats won 41, the Labour Party 30, the People’s Party (nationalists) 
25, the Rural Party eight, Socialist-Revolutionaries seven and Christian People’s 
Party five seats. National minorities (Germans and Russians) won four seats. 
August Rei, a social democrat, was elected Chairman of the Assembly. In Oc-
tober 1919 the Assembly passed the Land Act that abolished the big landow-
nership. Some land of the former manorial estates was given to the soldiers and 
officers who participated in the War of Independence. Peasants, who had not 
yet bought their land, became the tenants of the state that took over the land of 
the former estates. 
In June 1920 the new Constitution came into force and Estonia became a repu-
blic with a very clear dominating role for the parliament, as it did not include the 
formal position of the Head of State. The Prime Minister (Elder of State) had to 
fulfil the representative duties of a Head of State. The Parliament (Riigikogu) was 
elected for three years. 
The political instability of Estonia that followed was partly a result of the Con-
stitution. Underground Communists had boycotted the elections to the Consti-
tuent Assembly, but they did participate under the cover of the electoral lists of 
workers and trade unions and their influence was considerable. The leadership 
was also inside the borders. From autumn 1918 Viktor Kingissepp, de facto lea-
der of Estonian Communists, had lived secretly in Estonia. 
At the end of August 1919, still in the middle of the war, the First Congress 
of Estonian Trade Unions was held. 412 delegates entitled to vote were present. 
The Communists succeeded in taking control of the congress, and in the reso-
lutions the activities of social democrats, bourgeois parties and the government 
were criticised. The resolutions of the congress demanded an immediate end to 
the “intervention war ”against Soviet Russia followed by peace.10 On the second 
day of the congress, the Minister of the Interior, the Social Democrat Aleksander 
Hellat ordered the gathering to be dissolved. 102 activists were arrested to be sent 
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across the front to Soviet Russia, but 25 of them were deliberately executed near 
the front by the armoured train troops.11
After the end of the Independence War, the Communist agitation began to 
increase in Estonia. The large industries had lost their former markets and the 
unemployment rate was high. The agitation also had success among the rural 
workers’ unions, where most of the members were farmhands, workers at former 
manorial estates and other landless rural population. 
In 1920 the formally independent Estonian Communist Party was founded as 
a section of the Comintern. The party was illegal in Estonia. At the end of No-
vember 1920 elections were held to the 1st Riigikogu (parliament). Leftist parties 
were successful again: of the total of 100 seats the Labour Party won 22, the Social 
Democrats 18 and the Independent Socialist Workers’ Party (former socialist revo-
lutionaries) 11. The underground Communists participated in the electoral list of 
Tallinn Trade Unions Central Council and won five seats. They only got 5.3 % of 
all votes, but in Tallinn fully 30.2 %.12
At the same time the Estonian Security Police tried to suppress the Commu-
Organisation Chart of the Estonian Communist Party and Communist Youth (marked with 
red) in March 1924. (ERA, ERAF.24.5.12). Triangles on the left are marking the commu-
nist factions in the Parliament, county councils and rural municipalities respectively. Blue 
rectangles are the military departments of respective level, red rhombuses the same of the 
Communist Youth.
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nist organisations. Hundreds of Communists were sentenced at the Military Cir-
cuit Court from 1920 to 1925. Most were young men and women in their 20s 
and 30s.13 The largest of the trials against the Communists, the “Trial of 149” in 
November 1924, will be analysed below.
As already noted, Viktor Kingissepp had been illegally in Estonia since autumn 
1918. Jaan Anvelt, the former leader of the short-lived Bolshevik Government of 
winter 1917–18 and later leader of the coup, lived secretly in Estonia from from 
1921 to 1925. His deputy Otto Rästas was in Estonia during the years 1920 to 
1924, the military commander Valter Klein was in the country from 1923, etc. 
These cadres lived in workers’ slums of Tallinn in secret rooms of unpreten-
tious apartments of their most eager supporters. The spartan lifestyle mirrored 
the image of underground Communists. However, it had costs. Researchers ana-
lysing the survived correspondence of Kingissepp have noted an increase of his 
psychological problems caused by the constant danger of arrest.14
Jaan Anvelt, the coup leader, in 
1925. (RA, ERAF.2.1.953.1)
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A secret printing shop was established in farms near Tallinn. Here the leaflets 
and underground papers were printed. The Second and Third Congresses of the 
Estonian Communist Party (ECP) were held in 1921 and 1922 in these farms. 
The underground work was not only kept going by revolutionary spirit of young 
people and meagre donations of the local supporters. Plentiful financial support 
came from Soviet Russia via Comintern. Viktor Kingissepp testified in 1922 to the 
Security Police (Kaitsepolitsei) that the underground movement in Estonia was 
financed monthly with 300,000 – 400,000 Estonian Marks through the Estonian 
Section of the Comintern. To compare: the monthly salary of the Commander 
in Chief of Estonian Armed Forces Lieutenant General Laidoner in December 
1924 was 48,000 Marks. The farm where the secret printing shop of Communists 
was located was bought in 1920 for 300,000 Estonian Marks. In 1922 the Security 
Police found a warehouse with five tons of paper for Communist publications.15
Most arrested Communists were sentenced for shorter or longer time to forced 
labour or imprisonment; however, some were sentenced to death and executed. 
It became a general practice to exchange sentenced Communists with Estonian 
citizens arrested in Soviet Russia, but many of those exchanged to Russia were 
soon back in the Estonian Communist underground movement. 
An important success of the Estonian Security Police was the arrest of Viktor 
Kingissepp in early May 1922. After the interrogation Kingissepp was sentenced 
to death by a court-martial and executed. Another member of the Politburo of 
the ECP, Jaan Kreuks, was killed in a skirmish with Security Police operative in 
The safe house (of the caretaker of Tallinn Jewish cemetery) where Jaan Anvelt, Viktor Kingis-
sepp and Otto Rästas lived. Photo is taken in 1956 (RA, ERAF.2.1.125.1)
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Tallinn in March 1923. They and a number of others were honoured as martyrs 
after World War II and their names were given to the streets and enterprises. Jam-
burg in Leningrad oblast was renamed Kingissep in 1922. Kuressaare, the capital 
of island Saaremaa and the Saaremaa county, was named Kingissepp from 1952 
to 1990.
In the summer of 1921 the Third and during autumn 1922 the Fourth Congress 
of the Comintern were held in Moscow. Some changes in revolutionary approach 
were approved. In 1921 Profintern, the Red International of Labour Unions, was 
founded with the aim of taking over trade unions controlled by social democrats 
and other leftist parties. Another method decided was the call to create “united 
fronts of the working people”. These fronts should be led and controlled by the 
Communists, but workers’ organisations linked to other parties and also trade 
unions without a clear political orientation should be invited.16
The united front of the working people-tactics had some success in Estonia. At 
the beginning of 1922 the Tallinn Trade Unions Central Council (which accor-
ding to the Estonian Security Police, was in a fact the legal facade of the ECP) 
joined the front. The Congress of Delegates of Rural Workers’ Unions followed in 
March. In November 1922 the All-Estonian Congress of Trade Unions decided to 
join the Red International of Labour Unions. The 12 points of the front program 
included demands to dissolve the army and to arm the people, to release all poli-
tical prisoners, to abolish the State of War as a legal option, etc.17
In April 1922 the Communists arranged the split in the Independent Socialist 
Workers’ Party. Many members of the ECP joined the ISWP, and with the votes of 
these new members a new central committee was elected. The old leadership was 
forced to leave and created a new party under the old name, the ISWP. In June the 
Kingissepp after his arrest (RA, ERAF.9595.1.18.18, 19)
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original party now under Communist control was renamed the Estonian Working 
People’s Party18 and became one of the legal organisations of the ECP.
In the elections to the Second Riigikogu (Parliament) in May 1923 the Rural 
Party won 23, the Social Democrats 15, the Labour Party 12, the People’s Party 
and the Christian People’s Party each got eight seats. The new ISWP formed by 
the old leadership got five seats. 19 seats were divided between tiny parties and 
movements. But the Communists had a clear success: the list of the United Front 
of the Working People won 9.5% of the votes and 10 mandates in parliament. Se-
ven of these formed the faction of the Estonian Working People’s Party and the 
last three formed the faction of Communist Workers, but in the reality all 10 were 
controlled by the Communists. The united front was also successful at the local 
elections at the end of the year.19 In the elections of city councils they won 33.2 
% in Tallinn, in Narva 30.1 %, in Pärnu 27.4 % and in Tartu 23.5 % of the votes.20
Estonia had seven governments during the years 1920–1924, one of them la-
sted only two days. Minority governments of the People’s Party (Jaan Tõnisson) 
and the Labour Party (Ants Piip) were in office from July 1920 to January 1921. 
Thereafter four right-center coalition governments were formed, two of them 
led by Konstantin Päts. They were different combinations of Rural Party, Labour 
Party and People’s Party. In three of them the Christian People’s Party also parti-
cipated and in one the above mentioned Social Democrat Aleksander Hellat was 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
In 1923 a referendum was held on the question of removal of the religious 
education from the schools at school as proposed by the parliament. The Parlia-
ment’s proposal was rejected by the voters and the parliament was dissolved. It 
was a decisive victory for the small Christian People’s Party and in March 1924 it 
formed a minority coalition government with the Labour Party and the People’s 
Party led by Friedrich Akel. This government was still in office during the De-
cember coup.
In 1923 the economic situation of Estonia began to deteriorate. One of the 
main reasons was the effects of the so-called Russian gold. According to the Tartu 
Peace Treaty with Soviet Russia Estonia got 15 million golden roubles (11.6 me-
tric tons) from the former Russian gold reserve. This enabled the Bank of Estonia 
to give generous credits to Estonian enterprises to energise the economy. In addi-
tion, many millions of Soviet golden roubles flowed via Estonia to the West. This 
Soviet gold went to the West through the Bank of Estonia and private banks and 
the large profits earned were used for further credit. Estonia was one of very few 
windows to the international markets for Soviet Russia. 
Estonian businessmen, as many of their colleagues in the West, hoped that the 
situation in Russia would normalise soon in one way or another and invested 
accordingly. This hope was boosted by the introduction of new economic policy 
(NEP) in Russia in 1922 that offered certain freedom for entrepreneurs. Therefo-
re a large part of the lavish credit opportunities were used for creating companies 
for trading with Soviet Russia. Huge amounts of convenience goods were bought 
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from Western countries for the Russian market, factories waited for big orders, 
for example of the repair of hundreds of Russian locomotives, and so on. 
Another issue was the attempts to relaunch and prop-up the large factories 
– mostly in Tallinn – that had been built at the turn of the century to cover the 
needs of the Russian Army and Navy. There was a hope that the production of 
these companies would find markets in both Russia and in the West. Most of the 
projects focused on the Soviet Russia market failed.
We also have to understand that the members of Estonian tiny “high society” 
were tightly connected. The political and military leadership, including Konstan-
tin Päts and Johan Laidoner, the ministers of finance and trade and industry of 
this period and many other politicians were themselves partners or stakeholders 
of the companies, enterprises and private banks that had received the loans. At 
the same time some of them were Bank of Estonia council members. Their busi-
ness interests naturally influenced their political choices and they favoured infla-
tion. 
By early 1924 the Russian gold had mostly gone and there was no money for 
new credits to refinance the old ones. The experiences of hyperinflation policies 
used in Germany, Austria and Hungary were not encouraging, and unlike these 
large and established economies small Estonia had little realistic hope of foreign 
loans. Many enterprises went bankrupt, unemployment rose rapidly and some 
businessmen committed suicide including a former minister of industry and 
trade. By early 1924 the hope of the Communists in the economic crisis as an 
inseparable element in creating a revolutionary situation was not at all groundless 
in the Estonian case.
In May 1924 the portfolio of the Minister of Finance was taken over by a leader 
of the Labour Party, Otto Strandman. He began a resolute cut of government 
expenses, even a part of the annual conscript class had their training ended and 
was sent home. New loans were not given – there was no money anyway – and 
priority was given to the stabilisation of the Estonian currency. As a result the 
unemployment continued to increase which angered trade unions and leftist po-
liticians. 
However, with the start of the summer seasonal work, the agriculture began 
to increase employment and the economic situation began slowly to improve. 
In June 1924 a new gold-based currency unit, the Estonian golden kroon, was 
introduced. The value of this unit was made equal with the value of the Swedish 
krona. All loans given by the Bank of Estonia and private banks were changed to 
the value of golden kroon. The kroon became the currency of Estonia from the 
1st of January 1928.21 
Between 21 January and 30 March 1924 a total of 191 activists of the United 
Front, including the Communists and members of the Communist factions of 
the parliament, were arrested. In the same time the legal organisations under de 
facto Communist control were made illegal and dissolved by the government, 
including the Estonian Working People’s Party with its 106 local organisations.22 
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The arrests were followed by the Trial of 149 of the Military Circuit Court, 
which took place from 10 to 27 November 1924. In fact the number of defen-
dants ending-up in the courtroom was only 137, included 16 women. Eight had 
escaped to the Soviet Union, one had died and three did not appear in court (50 
of the arrested had been released during the preliminary investigation). This time 
the sentences were more severe and Estonian authorities decided that they would 
not exchange the convicted Communists with the Soviet Union after the end of 
proceedings. Jaan Tomp, chairman of the Central Council of the Workers’ Unions 
of Estonia, was sentenced to death and executed. In the courtroom he had called 
directly for the overthrow of the government. 39 men and women were senten-
ced to life-long forced labour, 74 defendants got sentences of forced labour from 
six to 15 years. 15 men and women got normal prison sentences of three to four 
years, and the rest were acquitted.23
The Communists sentenced to life or 15 years of forced labour were mostly 
young people. They were released fourteen years later at the amnesty of 1938.24 
They were thus saved from both the repressions after the December coup and 
from the the Stalin purges that took place when they still served their sentence 
in Estonia still outside his reach. After 1940 they got important positions in the 
Soviet-occupied Estonia. However, when new Stalin purges took place in Estonia 
in 1950 Estonian Communists who had lived in Estonia before 1940 were now 
replaced with those who had survived the purges in Soviet Russia and World War 
II. Many former “prison Communists” were accused of bourgeois nationalism or 
They were so young: Communist activists of Tartu in 1923 before the arrests. Olga Künnapuu 
in the photo’s centre (RA, EFA.275.0-47053)
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betrayal of the homeland and fired from their high positions. Some of them were 
sentenced to 25 years forced labour in Gulag, and Augustin Hansen, the ESSR 
Minister of Trade from 1943 to 1950, was executed in 1952. 
Johannes Lauristin (1899–1941) and Olga Künnapuu (1903–2005) were both 
senteced to lifelong forced labour at the November 1924 trial. Both were released 
in 1938 and soon married. Johannes Lauristin became head of Government as 
the Chairman of Council of People’s Commissars of the ESSR in 1940–1941. He 
died during the evacuation of Tallinn in August 1941, when German troops were 
again approaching the Estonian capital. Their impressive daughter Marju Lau-
ristin (1940), a Professor of the University of Tartu, became a member of the 
new Estonian Social Democratic Party after 1991, and Minister of Social Affairs 
in 1992–1994. She has been a Member of the European Parliament from 2014 to 
2017.
Preparations for the coup
Marxism and its derivative Marxism-Leninism were and are sometimes still 
claimed to be “scientific” social theories. Their cornerstone was a concept of the 
development of mankind from one social stage to another until the near utopian 
communism would be achieved. The change from older social stage to a more 
modern one happened usually in a revolutionary way. 
The Marxist theorists defined and found in history different forms of the revo-
lutions during the transition from the feudal organisation to capitalism and from 
capitalism to socialism. Examples of the bourgeois revolutions were the English 
in 1640, the American in 1776 and the French in 1789. Bourgeois-democratic 
revolutions took place in Continental Europe at the end of the 1840s and some 
elements of the coming socialist revolutions were experienced during the 1871 
Paris Commune. The theory was developed by Marx and Engels who based their 
views and expectations on their analysis of the history of the industrial growth 
and transformation in Western Europe during the second half of 19th century. 
For Marx and Engels the precondition for the socialist revolution was the emer-
ging of an industrial proletariat with a full self-consciousness of its key progres-
sive mission in the development of world history. The transition from capitalism 
to socialism should happen simultaneously all over the world or at least in the 
developed part of it in the form of a world revolution.
The theory was partly invalid in the case of Russia, where the industrial prole-
tariat had only begun to emerge by the early 20th century. The Russian revolutions 
of 1905 and in March 1917 were declared by Lenin and other Russian theorists to 
be simultaneous bourgeois and bourgeois-democratic revolutions. The October 
Revolution of 1917 was seen as a socialist revolution that had to be exported to 
the other countries by the revolutionary soldiers of the Russian, Austro-Hungari-
an and German armies as well as the proletariat in the more developed European 
countries. 
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However, by the beginning of 1920s the hope of a simultaneous world revo-
lution began to wane, and after Lenin’s death in 1924 Stalin began to promote a 
more pragmatic approach: the building up of socialism in one country.
According to the dogmatic Marxist-Leninist theory a revolution needed a “re-
volutionary situation” as a precondition before being launched and to succeed. 
According to the view of the Bolsheviks that situation had come in Estonia in 
1923–1924 due to the acute economic crisis. The growing support for the under-
ground Communists, described above, was also taken into account. 
Marxist-Leninist theorists presented this as something natural, coming from 
the development of economic and societal conditions; the role of subversive ac-
tivities of Communists was deliberately ignored and the role of financing from 
Soviet Russia was hushed up, but the results themselves, for example the takeover 
of the ISWP, were not denied. According to the official history of the ECP, the 
combat squads of the coup were formed by the ECP. 
According to the established Leninist concept of armed uprising the squads 
had to take under control the most important institutions and objects. Thereafter 
the revolutionary government would be created and the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat be proclaimed. The Soviet Union then only had to be asked for immediate 
military support to avoid the intervention of imperialist countries.25
The Communist December coup in Estonia was not the only one in Europe 
that followed 1918. Usually the list of Communist coups includes Hungary and 
Bavaria of 1919, the takeover of Georgia by the Soviets in 1920, the coup attempts 
in Germany in 1921 and the armed coup attempts in Hamburg and Bulgaria in 
1923. Less known is the attack of commandoes from the Soviet Union, supported 
by indoctrinated locals from among Russian and Ukrainian peasants at Tatarbu-
nary in Bessarabia (a part of Romania then) in September 1924.26
There were only indirect references in the Soviet historiography to the prepa-
rations inside the Soviet Union of the Tallinn coup. There are various reasons for 
that. 
Firstly, the revolution in a form of armed uprising had in principle to be started 
on the initiative of the local proletariat. 
Secondly, the coup itself and everything connected to the Comintern was in 
turn connected to Grigori Zinovjev, who was executed during the Stalin purges 
and as opposed to his many other fellow travellers was not salonfähig in the So-
viet historiography until the end of the Soviet Union. 
World revolution, although mentioned at every congress of the CPSU even 
after WW II, became an increasingly controversial issue, particularly after the 
invasion to Afghanistan, the Sandinist takeover in Nicaragua and the sending of 
the Cuban troops to Angola. 
However, the fact that the coup in Tallinn in 1924 was organised by the Soviet 
Union has never been a secret.27 The archives of the ECP, opened at the beginning 
of the 1990s, only gave the final evidence that had always been known to party hi-
storians like August Sunila, the author of the Soviet-Era monograph on the coup.
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The coup command chain could be described as follows:
1)  The Politburo of the Central Committee of Russian Communist (Bolshevik) 
Party.
2)  The Communist International (Comintern) and its Estonian Department.
3)  The Red Army General Staff Intelligence Directorate and Supply Department. 
4)  The Foreign Intelligence Department of the United Political Main Directorate 
(OGPU).
5)  The Underground Estonian Communist Party and its Central Committee Bu-
reau in Russia.
6)  The tactical staff – the War-Revolutionary Committee – formed in Estonia on 
29 November 1924 with nine members.
A coordinating body between the Party leadership, Comintern, the General Staff 
of the Red Army, OGPU and Estonian Communists, the Provisional Estonian 
Commission, was established in September 1924.
On August 12, 1924 the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party 
addressed the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party and 
asked for weapons as well as support for transportation of weapons and “respon-
sible comrades” to Estonia. It also asked permission to employ the Communist-
Estonians, who served in “responsible party, Soviet and military positions”, for 
the preparation of the coup and a permission to recruit volunteers. They noted 
that the revolutionary movement in Estonia was increasing and the right mo-
ment that would otherwise not recur during many years, would arrive in two-
three months.28 
Soon thereafter a Military Department of the Estonian Section of the Comin-
tern was established, led by a troika of a member of the ECP Central Committee 
and two trustworthy military specialists. The Military Department was tasked 
with the registration of military forces of the Estonian proletariat, i.e. Estonian 
Communists, on the territory of the USSR, their training for a civil war, the 
dispatch of trustworthy and trained instructors to Estonia and the formation of 
small (7–9 members) well-armed groups in the zone along the Estonian border 
from trustworthy Communists who were able to go immediately to Estonia at 
the moment when the uprising began. The Department should equip and sup-
ply the combat units in both Estonia and in the USSR, analyse intelligence, train 
command cadres and instructors for civil war and armed uprising.29 The Military 
Department would also act as the operational staff of the uprising. 
On 20 October the weapons for the coup were sent to the Kingissepp and 
Pskov rayons. They included 10 light and 10 heavy machine guns, 300 German 
rifles with 300 rounds for each rifle and 1,500 for each machine gun, as well as 
500 hand grenades.30 The Department asked for more weapons and equipment, 
including 500 rifles, 50 submachine guns, 34 light and 30 heavy machine guns, 
250,000 rounds for rifles and machine guns, one third of them anti-armour, 80 
revolvers and 1,700 rounds for them, 1,000 hand grenades and 4,000 Russian 
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3-inch artillery shells, half of them shrapnel.31 The correspondence about the we-
apons is confusing and it seems that the delivery did not live up to the hopes of 
the Estonian Communists. It was suggested to buy the weapons from arm dealers 
that could hide the Soviet participation in the preparation of the coup.
Let us outline the full potential of the “military forces of the Estonian proleta-
riat” in the USSR: According to a summary from autumn 1924 there were 171 
commanders and 131 members of administrative and economic staff of Estonian 
origin in various positions in the Red Army and Navy, including 23 officers of 
higher and senior level (there were no traditional rank structure in the Red Army 
at this this time). In addition, there were 66 cadets in the Estonian company of 
the Leningrad International Military School.32 The Military Department could 
also draw on the tens of thousands of Estonians living in the USSR including ve-
terans of the Red Estonian rifle regiments with combat experience from the Great 
War and the Russian Civil War. The Estonian students and staff of the Commu-
nist University of the National Minorities of the West were mobilised.33
The men and women recruited in the Soviet Union had to sign a certificate 
with three conditions before leaving for Estonia. They committed themselves to 
obey the orders of the Central Committee of the ECP, not to take any documents 
with them and in the case of arrest to identify themselves according to the false 
documents that were given them. They signed the certificates during the the se-
cond half of November.34
The personnel of the of the agencies of the Soviet Tranport and Foreign Trade 
organisations in Tallinn like Dobroflot, the Tsentrosojuz, the Oil Syndicate, the 
Grain Inspection and Trade Representation were used as a “fifth column”. Ac-
cording to the information of the Estonian Security Police, the Soviets only em-
ployed men and women loyal to them to these organisations. In 1924 these agen-
cies had 83 employees, mostly the citizens of Estonia. Many of them participated 
in the coup.35
Particular importance was given by the organisers of the coup to the Commu-
nists and their supporters in the Estonian army. According to the 1932 article of 
the Estonian Lieutenant Colonel Karl Laurits, untrained men from the reserve 
forces had been called up to receive basic training in 1924. Some of these had 
Communist sympathies, but they were released before 1 December and did not 
get a role in the coup.36 However, as became evident during the events, the Com-
munists still had their agents in the units of Estonian army. There were Commu-
nist agents in the Air Force squadron and the armoured car and tank battalion 
that tried to take over these important elements.
As already mentioned, an Estonian Commission responsible for coordinating 
the efforts of all central Party and military agencies in support of the coup was 
established. This provisional institution, created on 3 September, was to supervise 
the Estonian Communists in the planned coup. The members of the commission 
were only represented in the minutes with initials: at the first meeting, for exam-
ple “comrades U., Č., M., T., R., V. and Ž.”37 Jüri Ant has deciphered most of the 
174331-Læring og indsigt fra krig - Bind 2.indd   130 12/02/2018   10.00
The Communist coup attempt in Estonia  131
initials. According to him the following persons were among the members: Dmi-
tri Manuilski (Member of the Comintern Executive Committee), Jēkabs Bērziņš 
(Chief of the Red Army intelligence directorate), Jakov Pjatnicki (Member of the 
Comintern Executive Committee), Otto Ville Kuusinen (Secretary of the Com-
intern Executive Committee), Lev Kamenev (Member of the RC(B)P CC Politbu-
ro), Vjačeslav Molotov (Secretary of the RC(B)P CC), Jakov Unschlicht (Chief of 
Supply of the Red Army and member of the USSR Revolutionary War Council), 
Mixail Frunze (Chief of Staff of the Red Army), Jānis Žigurs (officer of the Red 
Army intelligence directorate), Ivan Bakaev (Head of the Political Directorate of 
the Leningrad Military Ditrict), Stanislaw Messing (Head of the OGPU in Lenin-
grad), Peter Zaluckij (Secretary of the RC(B)P Leningrad Province Committee) 
and Mixail Kobeckij (Soviet envoy to Estonia in 1924).38
The first meeting of the Estonian Commission defined the tasks of the commis-
sion. It was authorized to work with top secret information. The Commission was 
assigned to investigate and control the economic and political situation in Esto-
nia as well as the ECP and its allies. The information was to come from the Red 
Army intelligence directorate and from the OGPU. In this first meeting it was 
decided that in general the armed resistance of the Communists was permitted in 
a case of a coup against the “fascists” in Estonia. The ECP had to begin the mass 
agitation in support of joining Estonia to the Soviet Union. The possible change 
in the politics of the Soviet transit through Estonian ports was also discussed in 
this first meeting, possibly meaning the exploitation of the country after its an-
nexation.39
Three weeks later – on 24 September – the commission asked “comrade R”40 to 
compile the detailed plan of organisational and technical means in preparation 
of “possible events in Estonia” two weeks later. Near Estonian border the “working 
squads” (рабочие дружины) of Estonian comrades were to be formed, altogeth-
er 300 persons, simulating employment by lodging there. The RC(B)P CC was 
requested to allot finances for the purchase of 500 rifles, 70 Thompson subma-
chine guns41 and 200 Parabellum revolvers, thus adding non-Soviet firearms to 
the coup. Eight members were present at this meeting.42 
The decisions of the meeting of the Commission 1½ months later – on 10 No-
vember 1924 – were less optimistic in spite of fact that six of the eight members 
present were the same as in the earlier meeting. Now the Estonian comrades were 
warned against beginning a coup inadequately prepared and not at a right time. 
The Commission would only find itself able to decide on action after receiving 
exhaustive information about the level of the technical preparations. The Red 
Army political directorate was requested to dispach the soldiers and officers of 
the Red Army of Estonian origin to comrade R. (Rästas) that he needed. Com-
rade St. (allegedly Stalin) was also to be included in the Estonian Commission.43
There were now plans for the future after the successful coup. At the begin-
ning of October 1924 the ECP Central Committee sent a preliminary plan to 
Dmitri Manuilski with the intended political changes after the successful coup. 
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Two variants were proposed. The first was an Estonian People’s Republic with a 
people’s government of representatives of revolutionary workers, farmhands and 
smallholders. But such a government, even without Communists, was estimated 
as unsuitable because it would be seen internationally as a puppet government 
with the dictatorship of the proletariat behind it. The intervention of Finns or 
Latvians against such a government was seen as a real danger. A second option 
was a goverment with social democrats and the Labour Party. This option was fa-
voured by the ECP Central Committee44 as its puppet character was less obvious. 
The creation of local revolutionary committees in towns, rural municipalities, 
but also in factories and enterprises was described to the smallest detail in the 
plan. Political prisoners and smaller criminals should be released and conscripted 
into the army. The “enemies of the people”, meaning monarchists, active members 
of the bourgeois parties, policemen and the secret collaborators of the Security 
Police should be arrested and sentenced by the revolutionary tribunals. The pro-
ceedings in the tribunals should be as simple as possible, similar to those of a 
military court-martial. Capital punishment was foreseen for active members of 
the Defence League, Security Police officers, uniformed policemen who actively 
participated in fights against the revolution, active military officers and others.45
A letter sent by Tiibus to Moor and Käbi46 and dated 24 November noted that 
the Politburo of the RC(B)P Central Committee had estimated the situation with 
preparations of the coup as critical. Allegedly the Soviet highest leadership had 
decided to intervene in the preparations of the coup, because their sources had 
evaluated that the possibility of success was not very high. As mentioned this 
mirrored the view of the 10 November Estonian Commission meeting. The Po-
litburo suggested the postponement of the coup until the sea would be frozen to 
avoid the possible intervention of the British Royal Navy. Politically the Poliburo 
suggested the proclamation of a people’s republic in case of success of the coup. 
Initially it should only enter a political union with the Soviet Union, not be a for-
mal member.47 Many parts of the 1924 plan were realized in 1940 after the Soviet 
occupation. The concept of a people’s republic was experimented with at the time 
of the Tallinn coup in Outer Mongolia and Tannu Tuva.
On 29 November 1924 the order was given to stop the coup preparations, but 
it was too late already.
Communist Coup in Tallinn on 1 December 1924
The events of the coup have been described in a number of books and articles and 
the Soviet version does not differ a lot from the description of the events by J. Saar 
or the article by Karl Laurits. Usually these two authors have been the references 
until today. Both authors had access to the materials of Estonian government, 
Security Police, Estonian army and police, as well as to the interrogation minutes 
and the materials of the court proceedings in the Military Circuit Court, where 
the captured participants were sentenced. Laurits is also referencing the articles 
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of Jaan Anvelt and others in the Communist newspaper Edasi and journal Klas-
sivõitlus. 
According to Laurits and Neuberg, there were 400 men in the assault squads 
in Tallinn. These squads were divided among three “battalions”. In the first bat-
talion there should have been 170, in the second 120 and in the third 110 men. In 
fact only 227 showed up in the early morning of the 1 December, respectively 56, 
91 and 80.48 The assault squads had 100 revolvers of the type Parabellum with 50 
rounds for each, 60 carabines and rifles with fewer rounds, three Thompson sub-
machine guns with about 1,000 rounds each, 20 hand grenades and 20 bombs.49 
They hoped to capture more weapons from the military units in Tallinn. 24 % of 
the members of the assault squads had served in Estonian Army, 7.4 % in the Red 
Army, 11.1 % in Tsarist Army and 57.5 % had no military experience.50
Communists estimated the government forces opposing them as altogether 
760–830 men: 1) The Military School and cadet courses: 400; 2) The NCO School: 
200–250; 3) The Tallinn Commandant troops; 110–120; and 4) The Police Ca-
valry Reserve: 50–60. 
To this figure were added about 500 armed “fascists”, although the military ca-
pability of these was not estimated to be very high. Probably they had the mem-
bers of the volunteer Defence League in mind.
The Communists hoped that the police force in Tallinn (except the cavalry 
reserve, the riot control unit), the Tallinn Garrison (1st Battalion of the 10th in-
fantry regiment), the armoured car and tank battalion, the communications bat-
talion, the coastal artillery, the artillery battalion and the air force squadron at 
Lasnamäe airfield would stay passive. They even hoped that at least a part of these 
units will come over to the side of the Communists.51
The operational plan
The operational headquarters would be located in the town center at Tõnismägi 8 
(about 600–700 m from the Government building and the residence of the Elder 
of State on Toompea Hill). 
The First Battalion was to attack the military school (the Military Academy) 
and to take over its storage of hand guns. The second objective of the battalion 
was the narrow-gauge railway station Tallinn-Väike. 
The Second Battalion was planned to capture the barracks of the police cavalry 
reserve, the armoured car and tank battalion, the communications battalion, a 
police station, the air force squadron base and the barracks of the 10th Infantry 
Regiment. 
The Third Battalion should capture the Government Building, the Residence 
of the Elder of State, the War Ministry, the Central Post Office, the Central Sta-
tion (i.e. the broad-gauge railway station), a police station and the prison of pre-
liminary investigation. Additionally the railway bridges between Tapa and Tartu 
and between Tallinn and Tapa were to be blown up to hinder the transportation 
of the troops from North-East and South-East Estonia. The demolitions were 
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actually implemented, but the explosive charges were too small to destroy the 
bridges.52 
The ambitious tasks could only be achieved using the element of surprise and 
assumed as mentioned that at least part of the government troops would change 
the side. The first condition was realised in a part, the second proved to be an il-
lusion.
The defending forces
The Estonian Army and Security Police were informed of the preparations and 
plans for countermeasures were developed. Later it was realised as one of the 
main mistakes of Estonian military intelligence that it did not register the mea-
ning of the start of, using the modern term, three-week snap exercises of the So-
viet 56th Red Army Territorial Infantry Division in November-December, a for-
mation located in the area of Pskov-Ostrov-Novgorod-Staraja Russa. Karl Laurits 
wrote that Estonian officers and policemen mistakenly expected that the attempt 
The plan of the First Coup Battalion (ERAF.24.1.272a, 107)
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of the Communist coup d’etat would be preceeded by mass demonstrations orga-
nised by Estonian Bolsheviks and by attempts to take over the weapon storages. 
An adventuristic and amateur attack such as the one that actually took place on 1 
December was unexpected.
The Estonian military intelligence had agents in the assault squads. One was a 
Sergeant Major August Schaurup of the communications battalion. Another was 
Artur Teer, First Sergeant in the same battalion, and a third was Private Alfred 
Klemmer of the armoured car and tank battalion. However they got no chance to 
send warning in time because the assault squads had been formed already in the 
evening of 30 November and no leave was given before the operation started.53
The coup itself
The attacks began at 5.30 on 1 December 1924. The narrow-gauge railway station 
was captured and the deputy station chief and a policeman were killed. But one 
and half hour later the attackers left the station when a military unit approached.
The assault squad which was to capture the Preliminary Investigation Prison 
in the Old Town had to get its weapons from other squads after their capture of 
weapon storages. As this did not happen, the squad did not attack and dispersed 
without any action.
The attack against the barracks of the police cavalry reserve was unsuccessful. 
A bomb was thrown through the window of the barracks by the attackers, but it 
did not explode. The policemen opened fire, two attackers were killed and a third 
captured.
The attack against the Ministry of War was unsuccesful, too. The attackers en-
tered the building, but the guards resisted with fire and the assault squad had to 
give up the attempt.
The Military School was attacked by a group of 56 men with eight officers and 
NCOs, some of them in Estonian uniforms. They had initial success and entered 
the barracks where the cadets slept, but a desperate action of one cadet gave the 
time to others to get their rifles and return fire. However, four cadets were kil-
led and nine wounded. The casualties of the attackers were one killed and one 
wounded.
The communications battalion, the armoured car and tank battalion and the 
headquarters of the 10th regiment were at this time placed in the Juhkental quar-
ter of Tallinn, approximately where the headquarters of the Estonian Armed 
Forces are located today. There were some tank drivers from Russia among the 
attackers and they had an agent in the armoured car and tank battalion. They 
wanted to take over at least one tank. But their agent, who succeeded in sabota-
ging most of the tanks, was killed while driving the tank he wanted to take over. 
When that happened, the battalion NCOs had succeeded in organising resistan-
ce. But the duty officer of the communications battalion was killed as were three 
officers in the officers’ mess of the 10th Regiment.
The air force squadron at Lasnamäe was the only military unit that was succes-
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Map of Tallinn from 1927 (publised by the Üldise Ajakirjanduse Kontor (G. Paju), digitalized 
by Estonian National Library, http://www.digar.ee/id/nlib-digar:262534) with the author’s 
markings for the places of the key 1 December 1924 coup events. 
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sfully taken over by the assault squad. The duty officer was captured, but before 
that happened he succeeded in informing other units about the attack. 
The counter-attack of government troops began at 9.30. The assault squad gave 
the soldiers of the air base their weapons back and ordered them to resist the 
government troops, but the soldiers killed the squad commander. The squad had 
captured two aircraft with pilots and they tried to escape to the Soviet Union. 
One succeeded, the other landed on Estonian side of the border and the border 
guards captured the Communist.
The attacks against the central railway station, the Government building, the 
Central Post Office and the Residence of the Elder of State were all successful ini-
tially. The room of the guards of the Government Building was taken as was the 
Residence of the Elder of State (since 1995 the Residence of the German Ambas-
sador). The Elder of State, Friedrich Akel, succeeded to hide himself in the attic, 
while his aide-de-camp escaped from the house to seek help. When the Central 
Post Office was taken, the Tallinn Police Chief, Rudolf Saar, was captured. He had 
simply entered the post to see what is happening. The Central Post Office was 
recaptured after 6.45 in an action under the command of Major General Ernst 
Põdder and the Tallinn Commandant, Colonel Oskar Raudvere, with the support 
of an armoured car. At the time General Põdder was actually not supposed to be 
in Tallinn as he was the Commander of the 2nd Division that had its headquarters 
in Tartu, South-East Estonia. 
Reconnaissance and scout aircraft at the military airfield at Lasnamäe that came under coup 
control.( http://jaakjuske.blogspot.com.ee/2014/01/lasnamae-unustatud-sojavaelennuvalja.
html)
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The hardest fighting during the coup happened at the Central Railway Station, 
the place of the later monument. The attack of the Communists was led by Jakob 
Vakker. He shot the Minister of Communications Karl Kark, who happened to 
be at the station. 10–20 unarmed officers who were on their way to field exercises 
were arrested in the station. They were about to be executed when the attack of 
the government forces saved them. At 6.30 the police cavalry reserve unit arrived 
at the station, but they could not attack over the open square in front of the sta-
tion. At 8.15 two platoons of the NCO training battalion arrived and captured the 
station after a short fight. Their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hermann Ros-
sländer, was deadly wounded. Jaan Anvelt, the leader of the coup, was also in the 
Central Station. He retreated with couple of comrades in direction of the workers’ 
slum northwest from the station and Anvelt shot Lieutenant Commander Karl 
Stern whom they met in the street.
Based on later investigations the Estonian Political Police estimated that alto-
gether 285 armed fighters took part in the coup. 30–45 of them had come illegally 
The energetic commander 
of 2. Division in Tartu, 
Major-General Ernst Põd-
der, who reacted quickly 
to the coup after a night 
in the Officers’ Mess with 
other Independence War 
veterans. (1926 foto from 
the Defence League HQs 
(KL Peastaap))
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over the border from Russia shortly before the coup, 42 belonged to the staff of 
Dobroflot and 23 had been in service of the Soviet Trade Representation. About 
70 % of all participants of the coup were arrested later.54
The countermeasures of the government forces were rather improvised and 
ignored existing plans. However, one has to keep in mind that less than five years 
had passed since the end of the War of Independence and most of the officers and 
NCOs therefore had personal and recent combat experience. The attackers could 
not succeed in the essential parts of their plan; the capture of weapons storages 
and and the neutralisation of the military units in Tallinn. The coup lost momen-
tum soon and had already ended by mid-morning. 
21 were killed on the government side: five officers, four cadets, two soldiers, 
one military official and five policemen. The Minister of Communications Karl 
Kark, a railway station chief and the Inspector of the German Domschule and his 
driver were the collateral casualties. 25 military and 16 civilians were wounded. 
The attackers lost 12 men in the coup fighting.55
Villem Roobach was among 
the assault squad that captured 
the air force squadron. When 
goverment forces approached 
he forced a pilot to fly with 
him towards the Soviet border. 
The pilot provoked engine 
problems and landed on Esto-
nian side of the border. On the 
photo is Roobach after he had 
been captured by the Security 
Police, still partly disguised as 
an officer wearing a greatcoat 
(RA, ERA.1278.1.362.8).
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Comparing the situation in Estonia with that of Latvia and 
 Finland
During the first half of 1920s the subversive activity of the Communists belon-
ged to the most complex and difficult problems of internal security in almost 
all European countries from Finland to Portugal and from Italy to the United 
Kingdom. 
The internal security services of Finland, Estonia and Latvia held meetings 
to discuss the problem and exchange information. After the December Coup in 
Tallinn, one such meeting took place in Helsinki, Finland in November 1925. 
The key participants were Esko Riekki, head of the Finnish Central Investigative 
Police (Etsivä Keskuspoliisi), Jānis Voldemārs Ozoliņš, leader of the Political De-
partment of Latvian Ministry of Interior, and the head of the Estonian Political 
Police, August Tenson (after Estonization named Tuulse). The deliberations of 
the three chiefs indirectly help explaining why Estonia became the chosen target 
of the attempted coup.
Communist parties were illegal in all three countries, but as already noted, 
the legal workers’ unions and trade union organisations were used as an effective 
front for Communist activities such and agitation and Soviet propaganda. Accor-
ding to Tenson, the Estonian Goverment had acted indifferently to the Commu-
nist movement during the first years of independence, hoping that it would soon 
die out of itself. However in the local elections of 1923 18 % of the voters had 
voted for the legal organisations under Communist control. In the parliamen-
tary elections of the same year, about 10 % of votes went to the candidates under 
Communist control. 
From January 1924 the policy towards the Communist underground had be-
come more strict and hundreds of Communists and their supporters been arre-
sted. After the arrests of 1924 the Government had overestimated its success and 
reduced the staff and budget of the Security Police. According to Tenson, this was 
one of the reasons why the coup of 1924 came as a surprise for the government. 
Tenson’s remarks must be seen both as his excuse for the events and an expres-
sion of his resentment.
Latvia
The situation in Latvia was rather different, because after the end of German oc-
cupation in November 1918 the Communists had been in control of most of the 
country for more than half a year. Red Terror had caused hundreds of victims. 
The Communist Party then had about 8,000 members in Latvia, but most of these 
left for Soviet Russia in 1919–1920 or were killed in the battles of the Latvian War 
of Independence. The new underground Latvian Communist Party had been 
created after the war with its leadership located in the Soviet Russia. It used the 
Soviet Legation in Riga for contact with the party members. The 2nd secretary of 
the legation was a representative of the Soviet foreign intelligence. Ozoliņš said 
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that the same position was held by the intelligence representative in Soviet lega-
tions in other countries. During the first half of 1920s Latvia had already been 
forced to declare two 2nd secretaries of the Soviet legation personae non grata. The 
secretary of the consular office served as cover for the representative of the Soviet 
political police, the GPU. The correspondence between the Comintern and Lat-
vian underground Communists used the legation’s diplomatic courier service. To 
gain a foothold in Latvia, the Soviets were offering to take on works for Latvian 
enterprises, and it also used dumping to get access to the country’s market for 
such products as Soviet cotton and grain. 
Two thirds of about 900 members of the Latvian Communist Party were the 
youth present in various organisations, the strongest being the sports union Ener-
gy with 70 members. Like in Estonia the Latvian Communists initially succeeded 
in gaining controlling influence in the trade union movement. In a country-wide 
congress of the trade unions in 1922 they succeeded in gaining the support of 
13,000 workers against 3,500 who remained under the influence of the Social 
Democrats. However, by 1925 the support of the Communists had decreased, 
they had about 3,500 supporters left in the trade unions. Their strongest support 
remained the trade union of transport workers. 
The Latvian secret policemen believed that strong actions against the Commu-
nists would not have been necessary because the Social Democrats and Commu-
nists fought each other and the Communists had been losing. It was also im-
portant that neither the Communists nor the Social Democrats had support in 
the countryside after the land reform had transformed most of the peasants to 
landowners. 
The Latvian internal security service had no information about Communist 
fighters in Latvia, but knew that agitators, trained in Soviet Russia, were sent to 
Latvia. An important tool in fighting the Communist underground was the State 
of Emergency that allowed to keep persons under custody without charges and 
sentence until they agreed to leave the country.56
Finland
Finland was a Grand Duchy with large a degree of political autonomy until the 
end of the Tsarist Russia.57 Finns did not serve in the Russian army except as of-
ficers, mostly noblemen, who sought careers and fame via the Russian military 
schools and colleges like Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. Therefore 
few Finns fought in WW I, and except for the officers in Russian service they 
participated as individual volunteers in search for adventure, where most joined 
the German army. 
An exception was the Finnish Jäger Battalion No. 27, which was a full unit of 
the German Imperial Army that was trained in Lockstedt Camp in Holstein and 
fought in 1916–1917 in Courland on Latvian soil. The men were volunteers, a 
lot of them from among patriotic university and high school students, who went 
secretly via Sweden to Germany to be trained for fighting against Russia. They 
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returned to Finland in February 1918 and had a key role in the Finnish Civil War 
and later in the Finnish officer corps from the interwar period until as late as the 
1960s.
The Finnish Civil War that began after a successful Communist coup in Hel-
sinki was fought from January to May 1918 between Reds and Whites. Southern 
Finland was initially in the hands of Reds with their Red Guard forces that re-
ceived weapons from the Bolsheviks and political support from Leon Trotsky, 
initially Soviet People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs and from March 1918 of 
Military Affairs. In Northern Finland the Whites began to disarm the Russian 
troops dislocated in Finland. The parliament escaped from Helsinki to Vaasa in 
the North and appointed General Mannerheim as Commander-in-Chief. The 
Whites were supported by the German Baltic Sea Division that arrived in Finland 
in April under command of General Count Rüdiger von der Goltz. The Finnish 
Parliament invited a Prince of Hesse, Frederick Charles (Friedrich Karl) to be-
come the King of Finland in October. That idea had lost its relevance at the Ger-
man Revolution and defeat in November.
The Finnish Reds were defeated and cruel reprisals took place on both sides. 
The Reds had executed up to 1,500, the Whites more than 7,000 persons during 
the war. Up to 3,500 Whites and 5,200 Reds had been killed in the Civil War 
fighting. However, on the top of the Reds killed in action and those executed, 
11,652 Reds died in prison camps after the war of hunger and diseases such as flu. 
In total more than 1% of the Finnish population died of war-related causes as a 
result of the war.58
In 1922 the Finnish Socialist Workers’ Party was founded and the party suc-
ceeded in getting 14,8 % of the votes in the July 1922 parliamentary elections (27 
seats of 200). At the founding congress the party had joined the Comintern, and 
in parliamentary debates it not only demanded an investigation of the deaths in 
the prison camps after the civil war of 1918, the Party also called for declaring 
Finland a Soviet Republic, where the power would be in the hands of the majo-
rity, i.e. working class. 
The Central Investigative Police then moved to close the legal organisations 
of the Communists. In July 1923 the Goverment approved the arrest of 189 per-
sons, including members of the parliamentary faction of Socialist Workers’ Party. 
Ordinary Finnish Social Democrats were hesitant. On one hand an important 
competitor was excluded from the game, but on the other hand the left wing in 
the parliament in general lost influence.59
Despite clear similarities, above all the connection of the Communists and va-
rious leftist movements in all three countries with Comintern and Soviet Russia, 
there were big differences between three countries. Finland had fought a bloo-
dy civil war in spring 1918 and most of the Reds were the Finnish workers and 
peasants that had been clearly defeated and then brutally disciplined. The Esto-
nian Red cadres had left the country before the German occupation in February 
1918 and returned only with the Red Army from November 1918. Thereafter 
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they were quickly squeezed out of the country in April-May 1919. The Red Army 
had never reached the capital. In Latvia the Communists had the capital Riga in 
their hands from January to May 1919. They left Latvia together with the Red 
Army tainted by a cloud of massive attrocities.
In Latvia the First World War had been highly destructive with the front line 
area just south of Riga for half the war and with fighting spreading to much of the 
rest during the final year. The effects and losses reinforced the national divisions 
and created the partly civil war character of the Latvian War of Independence. No 
Latvians could be in any doubt of the threat of an externally supported Commu-
nist Fifth Column at the end of that war. 
In Finland the deep armed political divisions and tough actions against the 
Red opposition was just a natural extension of the Civil War.
In Estonia the absolute majority of the men in spite of their political affiliation 
fought in the Estonian Army for the national cause during the War of Indepen-
dence against a host of threats; Red invaders, Germans, White Russians and com-
binations. The war had not deepened national divisions and stigmatised political 
groups to the same extent as in the two other states.
The Latvian and Finnish history of the ten years after 1914 meant that the en-
vironment for the Communists of the two countries was considerably less liberal 
than in Estonia, where the Civil War crisis had been ended with relatively limited 
bloodshed in the offensive mobile fighting in a few spring months of 1919. The-
reafter most of the fighting and destruction had taken place beyond Estonia’s 
borders to the south and east. In early 1920 and as late as early 1924 Estonia was 
a far softer, more naïve target than the two other states. That changed in one 
morning.
Epiloque
At the government meeting in the morning of 1st of December a State of War 
was proclaimed and Lieutenant General Johan Laidoner (1884–1953) was nomi-
nated Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. General Laidoner had been 
the Commander-in-Chief during the Estonian War of Independence. He had left 
the service in spring 1920 and was currently a member of parliament. 
According to the Estonian Constitution the armed forces only had a comman-
der-in-chief in war or when a State of War was declared. In peacetime the armed 
forces were subordinated to the Ministry of War and the highest military officer 
was the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Most of the Estonian legislation of this 
time was still inherited from Tsarist Russia. Accordingly Division Commanders 
had the responsibilities of Governor Generals with civilian and judicial authority 
during the State of War. There were three Divisional Headquarters in Estonia: 
1st Division with headquarters in Rakvere (Northeastern direction), commanded 
by Major General Otto Heinze, 2nd Division with headquarters in Tartu (South-
eastern direction), commanded by Major General Ernst Põdder, and 3rd Division 
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with headquarters in Tallinn, commanded by Major General Aleksander Tõnis-
son.
With a formal State of War in place, military tribunals thereafter began to sen-
tence the captured participants. Most were court-martialled and executed right 
after the verdict, only those underage received prison sentences. At the same 
time the last participants were searched for and captured or killed in Tallinn 
workers’ slums and nearby villages. An example was Arnold Sommerling (1898–
1924), who had been sentenced to 10 years forced labour in the Trial of 115 in 
1922, and who had been exchanged to Soviet Russia. He returned illegally to 
Estonia in  November 1924 and was killed on 5 December 1924 in a farm near 
Tallinn together with two comrades, one of them a Communist member of Tal-
linn city council.60
On 29 December 1924 the military prosecutor, Major Konstantin Trakmann, 
reported to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces that the number of participants 
of the coup had been estimated to have been 200–250. 109 of these had been 
sentenced by the military tribunals in Tallinn and the Military School. 98 were 
sentenced to death and 97 executed. In Tartu, Narva and Tapa six persons alto-
gether had been sentenced to death. Among the executed were also four soldiers 
and Second Lieutenant Siegfried Fleischer (1903–1924), the duty officer of the 
General Johan Laidoner was returned 
to duty as Commander-in-Chief as 
part of the political reaction to events. 
(Foto: entsyklopeedia.ee from the col-
lection of Rein Helme)
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air force squadron. He had been court-martialled on 5 December 1924 for not 
resisting the attackers.
After the coup the Defence League (Kaitseliit) was reactivated. It was the vo-
luntary Home Guard national defence organisation, founded in 1918. 
Many participants of the coup, including Jaan Anvelt, succeeded to escape to 
the Soviet Union. On 19–20 April 1925 a secret conference of the participants 
was held to analyse the coup and the reasons for the failure. The keynote speaker 
was Grigori Zinovjev, the main speakers were Jaan Anvelt, Rudolf Vakmann and 
Otto Rästas.61
For the Estonian Communists the failing of the coup was unmitigated disaster. 
Most of their local underground groups were dissolved and the leaders were 
court-martialled in escaping to the Soviet Union. Some underground activities 
were only renewed in 1928–1929. A veteran of the coup of 1924, Johannes Jürna, 
who had succeeded to escape to the Soviet Union, was sent back to Tallinn to or-
ganise the underground movement at the beginning of 1930, but was killed soon 
in a skirmish with police operatives. The culmination of this short activation of 
the Communist underground was the assassination of Major General Johan Unt, 
the Commander of 3rd Division and simultaneously Tallinn Garrison in April 
1930, by an assassin hired by the Communists. The six-member Estonian Work-
ers’ Party faction in the Parliament, the cover organisation of the Communists, 
dissolved itself at the beginning of 1930. The leader of the party, the writer Valter 
Estonian communists with Zinovjev at the 5th Comintern Congress in July 1924. Otto Rästas 
is standing on the left (ERA, ERAF.2.1.1499.1)
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Kaaver (1904–1946) escaped to the Soviet Union, was soon arrested there and 
died in prison in 1946.
After the takeover by the Prime Minister Konstantin Päts in March 1934 and 
introduction of State of Emergency (mainly directed against right radicals), the 
left wing of the Social Democrats founded the Marxist Union of the Working 
People and began to seek new contacts with Comintern. 
In 1940, after the invasion of the Red Army, the four leading figures of the 
Union were selected by the Soviet legation and NKVD to be members of the pup-
pet “people’s government” (June-August 1940). The First Secretary of Estonian 
Communist Party in 1940–1941, Karl Säre, returned to Estonia in 1938. He had 
used the amnesty law issued by President Päts in May 1938 in connection with 
presidential elections, but did not get permission to live in Tallinn and other lar-
ger towns. However, he had been an agent of the Soviet foreign intelligence since 
1925 in different countries, including China, United Kingdom, United States and 
Canada, but last but not least in Copenhagen from 1934–1936.
The 1924 Communist coup attempt became a definite point of reference in 
The document with Stalin’s signature and decision of the CPSU Politburo to evacuate the 
participants of the coup belongs to the end of the chapter Communist coup in Tallinn on 1 
December 1924. It is just another piece of evidence of the direct and decisive participation of 
the highest Soviet leadership in the organisation of the coup. (RA, ERAF.24.1.281)
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later public political discourse in Estonia. One example was the coup of the right 
radicals in December 1935 that was disclosed by the Political Police during final 
preparation. In the newspapers it was immediately compared with the Commu-
nist coup eleven years earlier.
As already described, the Nachspiel of the coup took place in the second half of 
1940 and first half of 1941, after the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union. 
The NKVD, whose secret police department became the independent NKGB in 
February-March 1941, investigated the material on the coup thoroughly and ar-
rested many people. Many of them were executed in direct revenge, among others 
the Elder of State at the time, Fridrich Akel, the Chief of the Defence League in 
1924–1925, Aleksander Seiman, and others. The revenge could not touch Ernst 
Põdder, as he had died in 1932.62 August Tenson (Tuulse), who had built up the 
Estonian Defence (Political) Police during 1920–1935 and served later as the De-
puty of the Minister of Interior, committed suicide together with his wife on 23 
June 1940 less than a week after the Soviet invasion.
Conclusion
The coup on the 1 December 1924 is well documented and studied historically. 
Despite of the ideologically tainted treatment in the Soviet historical discourse 
– both sides used the event in their propaganda – the reconstruction of what hap-
pened is possible.
The side of the Communists overestimated the influence of their propaganda 
among Estonians during 1917–1924 and underestimated the effectiveness of the 
Estonian Security Police, and especially of the implications of the arrests at the 
beginning of 1924 that removed the most effective ECP cadres. One has to keep 
in mind the sincere conviction of many of the organisers and participants of the 
coup that the victory of the proletariat is unavoidable, eventually. Vice versa, the 
Estonian side clearly underestimated the risks of such an attack, overestimating 
the effect of their actions against the Communists.
The Soviet leadership was fully informed of the preparations at the highest 
level of Soviet Russia and Comintern. Both the Red Army and state security lea-
dership participated actively. However, for ideological reasons the Soviet partici-
pation was not highlighted, and the operation was presented as an action of the 
underground Estonian Communists or at least Comintern leadership.
The organisers of the coup succeeded in infiltrating many attackers into Esto-
nia and to keep the day and hour of the launching of the coup secret. However, 
the amateur leadership, a too ambitious operation plan, the relative lack of com-
bat experience of many participants and the indifference or even resistance of 
Estonian workers to the coup were the reasons of the abject failure.
The coup began unexpectedly for the goverment and the first steps of resi-
stance were improvised. The combat experience of the most of the officers and 
NCOs was important. After the short initial fluster the assault squads of the 
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Communists were easily and quickly defeated. Together with the arrests earlier 
in the same year, the Coup of 1 December 1924 was a destructive setback for the 
Communists in Estonia. The underground structures of the Communist Party 
in Estonia were only restored in 1928. The Estonian government began to turn 
more attention to the internal security. The Security Police was reorganised and 
renamed to Political Police, and the Defence League reactivated. 
It is often argued that the coup had finally defeated the symphathy towards 
the Communists among the workers and destitute peasants, but this is hard to 
prove. 
There are many concepts, ideas and methods in the documents of the coup 
that could be referenced in researching the later events. It this sense one of the 
euphemisms, used by the Communist literature, namely that it was the main re-
hearsal of the events in 1940 in the Baltic States, is not fully groundless.
An in-depth study of the events underline that what is currently named “Hy-
brid Warfare” during a period of formal peace is certainly not really a new idea 
even if history does not simply repeat itself. We can find some similarities bet-
ween the era of introduction of universal suffrage in most European countries at 
the beginning of the 20th century and the era of social media at the beginning of 
the 21st century. At the beginning of last century new political ideas like commu-
nism and radical nationalism won a lot of followers among the mass of new vo-
ters, peasants and workers, amplified by the collapse of the former imperial world 
and domestic certainties under the pressures of the Great War, birth of new na-
tional states and Soviet Russia, whose leaders prophesized the world revolution 
and thought it was necessary to safeguard their achievement. 
Here especially the influence of the new media of that time, the radio and cine-
ma are worth noting, accessible for the uneducated and even illiterate audience. 
They were skillfully used by the then modern propaganda of the populist political 
movements. 
At the beginning of the 21st century the social media created a new informa-
tion space accessible for everybody and despite an assumed much higher level 
of general education, that includes a knowledge of the world unequalled with 
the times hundred years earlier. However, the broader audience is not always in-
clined to treat the information with more independent criticism now than then. 
The propaganda products for selected parts of fragmented societies are generated 
especially by the radical movements. Similarly to the beginning of the last cen-
tury the old political elites were late in their reaction. 
Some elements are different, though. Before the signing of the Briand-Kellogg 
Treaty of 1928 the war was a legal tool of international politics. Even so, the Soviet 
class-struggle approach at the beginning of the 1920s included the winning of he-
arts and minds of the population of neighbouring countries before and justifying 
the invasion of the Red Army to safeguard progress in the national class struggles. 
There was a fruitful ground in many countries for it, including the susceptibility 
of big parts of the population to the Communist propaganda, the internal weak-
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ness of new states, deep social injustice, weak national identities and interethnic 
conflicts in multiethnic countries. 
During the Russian civil war a foundation of puppet Soviet states as the com-
petitors for loyalty of the population of the emerging national states was an ef-
fective method, used from the Baltics to the Far East. It proved useful in regaining 
control of Belarus, Ukraine, Caucasus, Central Asia and Far East. 
However, after the Soviet Russian signing of peace treaties with the neighbou-
ring countries a too open use of this tool was put temporarily aside. During the 
sunset of the idea of world revolution in the first half of 1920s, Comintern and 
sections of it, the mostly illegal Communist parties in many countries were used 
for the destabilisation of these countries especially attempting to split the work-
ers’ movement and takeover of the trade unions. 
The destabilisation operations were planned by the leadership of the Comin-
tern in tense cooperation with the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party, the in-
telligence directorate of the Red Army and the Soviet political police (OGPU), as 
we have seen on the example of December coup attempt in Estonia in 1924.
The use of activists, hired from among locals to receive political prepara-
tion and commando training in the Soviet Union was another tool. The active 
commando squads had to take over the strategic objects in the capital, to paralyse 
the army and police, to proclaim some sort of new government, claiming certain 
legality and support of the population, prepared by the Communist party, and 
ask the support of the Red Army.
However, the planners in the Soviet and Comintern headquarters were depen-
dent on the quite dogmatic Leninist revolution theory that prescribed the exi-
stence of the revolutionary situation as inevitable precondition for revolutionary 
takeover. Emergence of such a revolutionary situation was supported by diffe-
rent means: political destabilisation using in Estonian case the underground ECP 
and its legal cover organisations, the propaganda of the leaflets and underground 
Communist press and last but not least economic tools to increase the unemploy-
ment and herewith the dissatisfaction of the workers.
Similar methods, different in elements, of course, were used in other conflicts, 
too. As examples could be seen the Mukden incident in Manchuria in 1931, the 
beginning of the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland, when a pup-
pet government of Otto Ville Kuusinen was set up by the Soviets that claimed to 
be the only legal representative of the Finnish people, and in Budapest in October 
1944, when an SS task force replaced the government of Miklós Horthy with the 
Hungarian Nazis of Ferenc Szálasi.
Almost 100 years later the elements that were seen in Tallinn in 1924 are so-
metimes emphasized again as most suitable for the softening and manipulation 
of a target polity without a direct application of armed force. General Valery Ge-
rasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, has empha-
sized – using the Arab Spring as an example – the rising importance of political, 
economic, information, humanitarian and other non-military measures in the 
174331-Læring og indsigt fra krig - Bind 2.indd   149 12/02/2018   10.00
150  Toomas Hiio
21st century war. Such warfare would include the support of protest movements 
of the population, reinforced by information warfare and accompanied by special 
force operations.63 
Research of similar events in the more distant past, despite of the sometimes 
totally different environment, where they took place, gives us a possibility to 
establish some general trends of such actions or operations that could have been 
timeless.
Sources and historiography 
Historians had ample source collections in researching the Communist coup of 
1924 in Estonia. Archive materials of both sides have been preserved in the Esto-
nian National Archives and have been opened to the public. 
The archives of the Estonian Communist organisations, active in the Soviet 
Union, were added to Leningrad and Moscow archives after the Stalin purges, 
when the national Communist organisations had been annihilated and most of 
their leaders executed. The archives of Estonian Communist organisations were 
transferred to Estonia during 1946–1956 and became a part of the archival col-
lections of the Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the Estonian 
Communist Party. Most of the Soviet archives were closed to the public and only 
trusted party historians had access to the files. After the fall of the Soviet Union 
these archives became the part of the Estonian National Archives64 and are open 
to the public.
The series of the Military Department of the Bureau of the Central Committee 
of ECP in Russia65 are an important source that includes the lists of participants, 
correspondence, directives of different authorities etc. A lot of information on 
the coup and its participants can be found in the investigation and court files. 
Survived participants were sentenced by the Military Circuit Court (Sõjaringkon-
nakohus), a special court for crimes committed by military personnel as well as 
crimes against the state.66 The interrogation minutes and court proceedings in the 
cases of many participants of the coup are preserved there.
A parallel is the interrogation files of people, arrested for political reasons by 
the Soviet state security authorities beginning with summer 1940 in the then 
newly occupied Estonia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union a large part of 
these files remained in Estonia. One of the first target groups of the Soviet polit-
ical arrests were the officers of Estonian Political Police (the name of the internal 
security service in Estonia during 1925–1940), military officers as well as former 
or present members of the workers’ movement or the underground Communist 
party. The latter were suspected of cooperation with the Estonian Political Po-
lice.67 Survived participants of the coup of December 1924, but particularly the 
military and policemen, who participated in the suppression of it, were interro-
gated. Most of the latter were executed. 
The investigation and sentences of the Estonian Military Circuit Court of the 
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participants of the coup were carried through when the State of War was applied 
in Estonia. Until March 1934 Estonia was a democratic parliamentary state gov-
erned by the rule of law. The court system had continued to be more or less in-
dependent after the introduction of authoritarian regime. That, however, was not 
the case in the Soviet Union and during the first Soviet occupation period of 
1940–1941. This must be taken into account when using the files of the Soviet 
investigations. 
Interrogation minutes and court statements are always likely to be influenced 
by the accused person’s attempt to present actions and circumstances in a form 
favourable to him or her. However, in the special case of the Soviet State Security 
material one has to keep in mind that the investigators were more interested in 
the disclosure of alleged conspirative networks than in the personal guilt of a giv-
en person. For the Soviet State Security officers guilt was proven with the arrest. 
The very high number of arrests in 1924 and again in 1940–1941, when hun-
dreds of accused were interrogated, some very many times, combines with other 
evidence collected by the investigators to produce a very clear and convincing 
general picture. This even if a large part of the material of the Estonian Political 
Police and military intelligence was destroyed by the policemen and military of-
ficers themselves after the Soviet military bases were located to Estonia from Oc-
tober 1939. However, some files were preserved in Estonian National Archives.68 
There was a close cooperation between the Estonian secret police and its part-
ner service in Finland (State Police, Valtiollinen Poliisi, Valpo) particularly in the 
fight against underground Communist movements and Comintern agents. They 
exchanged reports and other documents and part of the reports of the Estonian 
secret police (at the beginning of the 1920s they were written in Russian, later in 
German) have survived in the National Archives of Finland.69
The number of Estonian newspapers in Estonia in the 1920s was significant. 
Larger political parties had their own newspapers, six issues in a week, and most 
of them are digitalized today.70 These dailies, from right to the left, were: Kaja 
(Põllumeestekogud, The Rural Party), Postimees (Rahvaerakond, The People’s Par-
ty), Vaba Maa (Tööerakond, The Labour Party), and Rahva Sõna (The Socialist 
Workers’ Party). Päewaleht was an independent, but politically rather right-wing 
daily. In Leningrad the newspaper of the Estonian Communists Edasi (Onward) 
was published during 1917–1937 and it too has been digitalized together with the 
monthly Klassivõitlus (Class Struggle). The Russian language newspaper Сегодня 
(Today), published in Riga, has been digitalized by the Latvian National Library.71 
In Estonia the Communist irregular underground newspaper Kommunist was 
printed in five issues in 1924.72
The importance of the coup and its suppression was acknowledged by the Es-
tonian authorities at once. In December 1924 Colonel Juhan Tõrvand, the chief 
of General Staff of the Estonian Army, wrote to the Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and proposed the publication of a book in “French, English, German and 
maybe also in Russian” on the events of 1 December 1924, because “they are pre-
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senting a good opportunity to make positive propaganda for Estonia abroad”.73 In 
1925 a report under the pseudonym J. Saar74 was published and translated into 
French.75 The English, German and Russian versions were never written. The 
book was reprinted in 1982–1983 in Toronto by Estonian exile newspaper Vaba 
Eestlane and once again after the re-establishment of Estonian independence.76 
The first account, analyzing the military part of the coup, was published three 
weeks after the coup by Lieutenant Colonel August Traksmann (later Traksmaa, 
Major General, 1893–1942, executed by the Soviets) in the weekly of the Ministry 
of War Sõdur (Soldier).77 An illustrated booklet with speeches, obituaries of the 
people killed during the coup and a short overview was published in 1924, too.78 
Estonian Communists reported the event beginning from 3 December 1924 in 
their newspaper Edasi in Leningrad. A comprehensive analysis of events and the 
reasons for failure was written by Jaan Anvelt and published few months after the 
coup in the Estonian Communist monthly Klassivõitlus in Leningrad.79
In 1932 Lieutenant Colonel Karl Laurits (1892–1941, executed by the Soviets), 
the head of 2nd Department of the Main Headquarters of the Estonian Armed 
Forces then, published a study on the coup of 1 December 1924 in the weekly 
Sõdur.80 The reason to publish the article was not the current political situation 
in many countries in Europe, including Estonia, where the paramilitaries of the 
right radicals and the left radicals fought each other in the streets. The study was 
simply a reaction to the publication of a book under the pseudonym A. Neuberg 
with theoretical considerations on armed insurrection that had dedicated a chap-
ter to the December coup in Tallinn eight years earlier.81 
The coup became important again in 1940 after Estonia was occupied by the 
Soviet Union. Ideologically the coup was proclaimed to be a milestone on the path 
of Estonian working people towards socialism and a Communist society. Most of 
the participants who had received prison sentences in Estonia were still alive, as 
were policemen and military personnel who participated in actions against the 
coup. The latter were arrested soon by the NKVD and mostly executed. 
The situation of participants was more ambivalent. Anvelt and other leaders of 
the coup, who had escaped to the Soviet Union, had been executed during Stalin 
purges a few years earlier. Most of the Estonian Communists who were sent to 
prison in 1924–1925 had been released from Estonian prisons in May 1938 at the 
Amnesty in connection with the election of Konstantin Päts as President of the 
Republic. They were mistrusted by the Soviet authorities and some of them were 
later accused of Trotskyism. A third category were those who had cooperated 
(supposedly or actually) with the Estonian political police and therefore been 
released earlier. They were arrested at once and were among the first of those 
executed by the decision of the war tribunal of the NKVD Baltic district from the 
end of the year 1940.
In 1960 August-Voldemar Sunila (1918–2008) defended his history master 
thesis (actually the Soviet candidate degrees were recognised as PhD since the 
beginning of 1990s in Estonia) on the 1 December Coup and it was published as 
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a monograph in 1961.82 The work of Sunila was the main source of all following 
publications on the coup in Estonia until the end of the Soviet Era in Estonia. In 
1974 followed the publication of a collection of relevant documents.83
Some historians abroad were also interested, and historical overviews were 
published in connection with anniversaries of the coup. In 1974 an article by 
Oskar Angelus was printed in a Baltic-German yearbook.84 Angelus (1892–1979) 
had been a high-level official of the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs during 
the period 1921–1940. During the German occupation 1941–1944 he served as 
the Director for Internal Affairs of the Estonian Self-Administration. Ten years 
later a booklet in German was published by Woldemar Erik Thomson (1915–
1990), a Baltic German author and research fellow of Ost-Akademie in Lüne-
burg.85 In the same year a comprehensive study with an excellent overview of 
literature on the topic was published by Hain Rebas (born 1943).86 A book by Fin-
nish historian Osmo Jussila about the Finnish 1939–1940 puppet Government in 
Terijoki, lead by Otto-Ville Kuusinen, is also relevant. In the book Jussila analyses 
the similarities and differences of various Soviet-initiated coups, from 1918 in 
former parts of Tsarist Russia to 1979 in Afghanistan.87
Some newer books should also be mentioned. In 2010 Olaf Kuuli (1929–2012), 
former research fellow at the Party History Institute at the Central Committee of 
the Estonian Communist Party published a book on the internal clashes of Esto-
nian Communists during 1919–1938.88 Jaak Valge (born 1955), who is resear-
ching the contacts of the Estonian leftist intellectuals with the Communists and 
the Soviet Union during the interwar period, published the first part of his study 
in 2014.89 The younger historians Reigo Rosenthal and Marko Tamming (both 
born in 1981) have published two volumnious books on the history of Estonian 
Security Police/Estonian Political Police.90 
The numerous memoirs on the coup are drawing in information from con-
temporary newspapers, adding some personal emotions to the well-known hi-
storical facts. The diaries of contemporaries are of more value, for example the 
diary of Eduard Laaman from 1922–1940 and of Elmar Kirotar (1899–1985), 
who served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1919–1940.91 Two men who had 
been arrested by the Estonian Political Police published their memoirs during the 
1930s: Edgar Sein (1908–1941, executed by the Soviets), participated as a school-
boy in the coup and was sentenced to three years in prison. His memoirs came 
out as a feuilleton in Rahvaleht (People’s Paper, a tabloid) in 1937.92 Voldemar 
Teppich-Kasemets (1899–1941, executed by the Soviets), was sentenced in 1921 
for Communist activities to six years of forced labour, but was exchanged to So-
viet Russia. He was sent back to Estonia to the underground work in 1931, was 
arrested in 1932 and sentenced to 12 years forced labour. He was disappointed in 
the Communist movement, was pardoned in 1933 and published his memoirs in 
the daily Päewaleht the same year.93
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